Check back frequently for updates. If you would like to not see this alert again, please click the "Do not show me this again" check box below. We are The Intelligence Community. We are Creative. We are Determined. We are Passionate. We are Everyday People. Witness the "Evolution of Espionage in America". A Spy's Eye View of the Future. Barrier Breakers. A Day in the Life. We are Air Force We work for 18 IC organizations that each focus on a different aspect of our common mission.
We are Army We work for 18 IC organizations that each focus on a different aspect of our common mission. We are Coast Guard We work for 18 IC organizations that each focus on a different aspect of our common mission. We are Marines We work for 18 IC organizations that each focus on a different aspect of our common mission. We are Navy We work for 18 IC organizations that each focus on a different aspect of our common mission.
We are State We work for 18 IC organizations that each focus on a different aspect of our common mission. We are Space Force We work for 18 IC organizations that each focus on a different aspect of our common mission. IC business data include information about intelligence customer behavior such as page views, attention time within a report, user journey—how the customer finds the report or product and where they go next—and volume of reports or articles accessed per visit.
They may also combine that customer data to allow for identification of consumer trends and tailoring of future products to consumer preferences. These consumers include the president and his or her national security team, homeland security and law enforcement consumers, Congress, and can also include systems that depend on intelligence information as an input to perform tasks for other purposes. This issue brief explores how the IC can harness the power of business analytics to improve the performance of its mission.
It explores the discipline of business analytics; explains why the IC is late to adopt modern business intelligence practices; and makes the case that the IC should immediately invest in developing its own sophisticated business analytics standards and methodology.
It then anticipates some problems the IC is likely to encounter—problems ranging from technical interoperability, secrecy and security, and cultural obstacles—and proposes solutions before making recommendations for how the IC can leverage business analytics to improve its value and performance in achieving U.
Business analytics is an emerging discipline. As recently as , there was no single, widely known, authoritative definition of the term. Business analytics is critically important across industry sectors. While it is used in health care, information technology, financial services, and education, it is most visible in the retail sector, where loyalty programs, customer tracking, and market research create insights that are used to make decisions about products, promotions, price, and distribution management.
Predictive models use previous customer interactions to predict future events and are used in sales forecasting and merchandise planning and allocation. In fact, business analytics—and its related tools, business intelligence, and data visualization—is viewed as so central to modern business decision-making that executive education courses offering business analytics certifications are on offer at business schools across the country, from the University of California, Berkeley, to New York University and Wharton.
Other corporations often have roles for chief analytics officers or similar titles. It provides key evidence-based insights for decision-makers that can inform business decisions and strategy. It provides a more direct channel to consumers and customers, enabling an effective feedback loop and the ability to track customer behavior and use of products. It also helps leaders make tough decisions about what works and what does not and can provide a data-driven rationale for cutting a business or expanding into new areas.
It does not. This legacy model was the result both of older information technology and bespoke technological solutions designed to offer more protection for highly classified intelligence information.
This federated model permits each department and agency to derive some insights from its intelligence products and applications, but only within its own information silos. There are many well-documented shortcomings with this approach, but less often discussed is that it prevents anyone in the IC from having access to a complete picture of the reach and impact of intelligence reports and products. As a consequence, at a time when the rest of the world is using data to derive new insights and to evaluate business decisions and strategy, the IC has fallen behind, unable to acquire even the most basic information about the number of times reports are accessed and by whom.
Lacking comprehensive data to inform assessments of impact, the IC continues to rely on outdated anecdotal feedback mechanisms, including written descriptions of the interest and amount of time spent by a policymaker briefed on a particular intelligence report.
Such descriptions are highly prized within the intelligence community, particularly at the CIA. To some, it may be unsurprising that the IC derives meaning from such subtlety; after all, the IC is trained to do so.
But there are other institutional and cultural reasons why the IC has not embraced metrics and data as key indicators of value and impact. Most obviously, intelligence reports are not commodities.
While sales numbers and advertising clicks may be strong indicators of impact in other sectors, the utility of such measures within the IC is less clear and may even be misleading. That is because the IC exists to serve a different mission: provide insights and information to inform national security policymaking. Because the intelligence community rightly considers impact as more than the number of clicks, such measures can never on their own be sufficient to determine the value or impact of a particular report.
The nature of the intelligence mission often defies simple numeric measures, and the consequences of making decisions based on flawed metrics could be severe. This, unfortunately, is why many good efforts to assess the value of IC collection and analysis have failed. However, in rejecting quantitative measures as inherently flawed, the IC is missing the opportunity to find meaningful insights from imperfect sources—something the IC does exceptionally well in other contexts.
Quantitative data may not be a perfect proxy for the value of IC collection and analysis, but that does not mean it is not a critical input. No single source will provide all of the information the IC needs to a degree of accuracy it would trust, but it is possible to find context and trends within the data to make informed decisions even from imperfect information.
Some departments and agencies are beginning to see the value of the insights that imperfect data can provide. A few ambitious efforts have cropped up in some agencies and shown tremendous promise. But there are limits to what those efforts will be able to achieve without the ability to look across the IC to see where each department or agency is adding unique or disproportionate value. An agency will also be unable to determine when—in light of what other agencies are contributing—its capacity is over- or underinvested.
The bottom line is that, at the enterprise level, the IC develops and provides no systematic, all-inclusive, quantitative data about intelligence collection and analysis to inform leadership decision-making. As a result, the IC does not know how foundational business data—even flawed, imperfect data—can be useful to it.
Instead, the IC has created complex systems and processes to compensate for the data it lacks. In almost all cases, these systems allow departments and agencies to maintain a significant degree of independence.
Since there are no standard measures of value and impact across agencies, there are few opportunities to challenge agency decisions or question budget justifications and even fewer opportunities to identify and make informed trade-offs across departments and agencies. For many, this system works to their advantage and there are few incentives to pursue significant changes.
As a result, bureaucratic inertia has worked to thwart past efforts to develop the kind of data this paper argues are needed.
The ODNI is the only entity with the mission and authority to mandate, manage, and oversee the collection and integration of comprehensive business data from across the intelligence community. In addition, the ODNI is well positioned to analyze enterprise business data and provide useful insights that IC elements can use. While individual IC elements can and do seek to understand the limited business data they currently produce, they are unable to look at data across IC departments and agencies to derive broader insights.
There are several compelling reasons for the IC to adopt a new, comprehensive approach to collecting and analyzing information about its products.
To report a potential civil liberties and privacy violation or file a complaint, please review the requirements at the CLPT homepage. The IC EEOD Office is committed to providing equal employment opportunity for all employees and applicants based on merit and without regard to race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, sexual orientation, and physical or mental disability.
If you have worked for the ODNI in a staff or contract capacity and are intending to share intelligence-related information with the public through social media posts, books or television and film productions, you will need to submit the materials for approval.
The Intelligence Community provides dynamic careers to talented professionals in almost every career category. ODNI is primarily a staff organization that employs subject-matter experts in the areas of collection, analysis, acquisition, policy, human resources, and management. Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity tackles some of the most difficult challenges across the intelligence agencies and disciplines, and results from its programs are expected to transition to its IC customers.
IARPA does not have an operational mission and does not deploy technologies directly to the field. If you would like to learn more about engaging with IARPA on their highly innovative work that is already positively impacting the U. Intelligence Community and society in general, please follow the link below.
Track the latest developments and stories of interest from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence:. If you would like to not see this alert again, please click the "Do not show me this again" check box below.
The U. The USAF ISR Enterprise delivers decision advantage in order to enable commanders to achieve kinetic and non-kinetic effects on targets anywhere on the globe in support of national, strategic, operational, and tactical requirements. Army Intelligence G-2 is responsible for policy formulation, planning, programming, budgeting, management, staff supervision, evaluation, and oversight for intelligence activities for the Department of the Army.
Visit Site. The CIA director is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The Coast Guard's broad responsibilities include protecting citizens from the sea maritime safety , protecting America from threats delivered by the sea maritime security , and protecting the sea itself maritime stewardship. The Coast Guard's persistent presence in the maritime domain, due to its diverse mission sets and broad legal authorities, allows it to fill a unique niche within the Intelligence Community.
Because of its unique access, emphasis, and expertise in the maritime domain Coast Guard Intelligence can collect and report intelligence that not only supports Coast Guard missions, but also supports national objectives. Coast Guard Intelligence strives to create decision advantage to advance U.
With more than 16, military and civilian employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence and provides military intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners, in the DOD and the Intelligence Community, in support of U. The DIA director serves as principal adviser to the secretary of defense and to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of military intelligence. The director also chairs the Military Intelligence Board, which coordinates activities of the defense intelligence community.
Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is responsible for the intelligence and counterintelligence activities throughout the DOE complex, including nearly 30 intelligence and counterintelligence offices nationwide. The mission is to protect, enable, and represent the vast scientific brain trust resident in DOE's laboratories and plants.
The office protects vital national security information and technologies, representing intellectual property of incalculable value, and provides unmatched scientific and technical expertise to the U. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for using information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the U.
DHS Intelligence focuses on four strategic areas: Promote understanding of threats through intelligence analysis; Collect information and intelligence pertinent to homeland security; Share information necessary for action; and Manage intelligence for the homeland security enterprise. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides the Secretary of State with timely, objective analysis of global developments as well as real-time insights from all-source intelligence.
It serves as the focal point within the Department of State for all policy issues and activities involving the Intelligence Community. INR's expert, independent foreign affairs analysts draw on all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, INR's public opinion polling, and interaction with U.
Their strong regional and functional backgrounds allow them to respond rapidly to changing policy priorities and to provide early warning and in-depth analysis of events and trends that affect U.
OIA is responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information related to the operation and responsibilities of the Department of the Treasury. OIA is a component of the U. The Drug Enforcement Administration is responsible for enforcing the controlled substance laws and regulations of the United States. ONSI facilitates full and appropriate intelligence coordination and information sharing with other members of the U.
Intelligence Community and homeland security elements.
0コメント